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ARIZONA V CALIFORNIA: FINALITY AS A
WATER MANAGEMENT TOOL
In the arid western region of the United States, water is especially criti-
cal to growth and development. The Colorado River, with its vast drain-
age area,' has been called the single most important water source in the
West.2 The rapid pace of development in this region has spurred competi-
tion for its limited water resources.3 Some studies project that given the
continued all-out pace of energy development, the Colorado River's water
supply may be exhausted by the end of the century.4
Since the 1920's there have been conflicting claims to the water supply of
the Colorado River.' Included among the many claimants are the Indian
tribes residing in the Colorado basin. In 1908, the United States Supreme
Court ruled that the creation of Indian reservations by the federal govern-
ment implied a simultaneous reservation of water for use on those lands.6
1. The Colorado River drains an area of 242,000 square miles in seven states, an area
equal to one-twelfth of the contiguous continental United States. Black & Taylor, Navajo
Reserved Water Rights. Pulling the Plug on the Colorado River?, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 71
(1980).
2. Burness & Quirk, Water Laws, Water Transfers, and Economic Efficiency. the Colo-
rado River, 23 J.L. ECON. I11 (1980).
3. Blundell, Colorado River, Vital to the Southwest, Travels Ever-Rockier Course, Wall
St. J., Feb. 12, 1979, at 1, col. 1. Water has always been in short supply in this arid region of
the United States. State officials note that the normal flow of most western streams has been
fully appropriated, and in some cases overappropriated, for withdrawal uses. The demand
for water, however, continues to increase, spurred by energy development and the protection
of aesthetic values (fish and wildlife habitat, scenic beauty, and recreational uses) as well as
ever-present irrigation and municipal demands. Surface water diversions exceed supply in
four of the seven basins in the western United States. In addition, ground water supplies
have been depleted over wide areas of the West. U.S. General Accounting Office, Reserved
Water Rights for Federal and Indian Reservations: A Growing Controversy in Need of Resolu-
tion, 1-2 (CED 78-176, Nov. 16, 1978) [hereinafter cited as G.A.O. REPORT].
4. Blundell, supra note 3, at 16, col. 5. The writer also notes, however, that studies by
the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation anticipate a slower pace of energy development, estimating
there is enough water to last well into the 21st century.
5. See Trelease,.4rizona v. Calfornia: Allocation of Water Resources to People, States,
and Nation, 1963 SuP. CT. REV. 158, 160-63.
6. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). This principle is known as the re-
served water right, or Winters doctrine. It applies to all Indian reservations regardless of
whether they have been created by treaty, an act of Congress, or executive order. See
United States v. Walkers River Irrigation Project, 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939). When pub-
lic lands are withdrawn or reserved from the public domain, the quantity of water necessary
to fulfill the purposes for which the land was withdrawn is simultaneously reserved. The
Indian reservation thus acquires reserved water rights that vest on the date the reservation of
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These reserved water rights are an important economic resource for the
Indians, whose reservations occupy significant acreage in the Southwest.
The water resources claimed by the Indians are also a major source of
water for irrigation, industries, and communities outside the reservation.'
The undefined and potentially significant amounts of water needed for the
reservations pose a threat to economies that depend on these water re-
sources, 9 and to the extent that the scope and nature of these water rights
remain undefined, they are a source of bitter controversy."0 This contro-
versy, in turn, has induced reliance on water allotments that have been
fixed through litigation." In Arizona v. California,'2 the Supreme Court
addressed whether water rights reserved for the Indians in earlier litigation
should be recalculated on the basis of evidence that the previous allotment
should have been greater.' 3 The majority emphasized the delicate balance
of water supply and demand, and in the interests of certainty and finality
land was made, and are superior to all future appropriators under state law. See G.A.O.
REPORT, supra note 3, at 4; see also infra note 97 and accompanying text.
7. There are over 200 reservations in the United States, encompassing more than 50
million acres of land. See G.A.O. REPORT, supra note 3, at 20-21. Of these reservations, 172
are located in the II western states. These reservations occupy about 12% of the private
lands in the west, and support approximately 1% of the region's population. Comment,
Indian Reserved Water Rights. The Winters of Our Discontent, 88 YALE L.J. 1689 (1979).
8. For example, officials of the Metropolitan Water District, the agency in charge of
obtaining Colorado river water for both the Los Angeles and San Diego metropolitan areas,
estimated that the favorable decision in Arizona v. California, 103 S. Ct. 1382 (1983), effec-
tively restored the district's access to 82,000 acre-feet of water per year. This amount repre-
sents approximately 10% of the district's total allocation of Colorado River water. The
general counsel for the district stated it would take "millions and millions" of dollars to
make up for the loss of this water. Mann, Indians Lose Court Bidfor More Water, Los
Angeles Times, Mar. 31, 1983, at 1, col. 4.
9. See Black & Taylor, supra note 1, at 90.
10. Although federal reservations are a major source of water in the West, the quantity
and scope of their reserved water rights remain undefined in most cases. Except where allot-
ments have been litigated, the amount of water reserved for the reservations, its sources, and
the purposes for which it may be used have not been determined. As a consequence of this
uncertainty, state administrators and potential appropriators often cannot determine what
waters are available for appropriation, and what state-created water users may be displaced
by the exercise of prior reserved rights. See G.A.O. REPORT, supra note 3, at 6-7; see also
Comment, supra note 7, at 1690 (concluding that legal uncertainty surrounding Indian water
rights "impairs public water planning, distorts water investment decisions, and handicaps
negotiations important to Indian economic development").
I1. Special Master Tuttle stated that "not a great deal of evidence is needed to convince
anyone that western states would rely upon water rights adjudications." Arizona v. Califor-
nia, 103 S. Ct. at 1392.
12. 103 S. Ct. 1382 (1983).
13. Barbash, Too Late to Erase U.S. Error in Indian Pact, Court Holds, Wash. Post,
Mar. 31, 1983, at Al, col. 4. This article reported that the tribes received roughly 22% less
water than they should have. Id. The majority opinion in Arizona fixed the requested in-
crease at between 15% and 22%. Arizona, 103 S. Ct. at 1395.
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refused to reconsider whether the Indians were entitled to a greater
allotment. 14
Arizona v. California is the latest Supreme Court pronouncement in a
protracted dispute over the division of the Colorado River's water supply.
In 1922, the states bordering the Colorado River drafted the Colorado
River compact. Although the compact divided the river between upper
and lower basin states, individual state allotments remained unresolved.'
5
An agreement was eventually reached on apportionment of the upper ba-
sin.16 The dispute over the lower-basin waters, however, resulted in litiga-
tion. In 1952, Arizona invoked the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction, 7 seeking both to confirm her title to the Colorado River and
to limit California's use.' 8 Nevada intervened and New Mexico and Ari-
zona were later added as defendants.' 9 The United States also intervened
in order to protect federal reserved water rights, 2° including rights secured
for the reservations of five Indian tribes.2 '
The Court addressed whether the federal government had reserved
water rights for the tribes it represented. In upholding the government's
claim, the majority asserted that these rights should be measured by the
amount of irrigable acreage within each Indian reservation. 22 The Court
14. Arizona, 103 S. Ct. at 1391-92.
15. Trelease, supra note 5, at 160. The seven states comprising the Colorado basin in-
clude Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming. The Col-
orado River compact split the dependable average flow of 15 million acre-feet equally
between the upper and lower basin. This allayed the fears of the upper-basin states that
earlier development in the lower basin would establish water use priorities that would limit
future development in the upper basin. Id.
16. Id. This agreement was spurred by the Bureau of Reclamation, which refused to
start its postwar program until it was assured that its water projects fell within the share of
the state in which they were built. Id.
17. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
18. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
19. Id.
20. The enormous scope of the controversy produced "one of the great state trials of all
time." Trelease, supra note 5, at 165. The trial lasted 123 days spread over three years,
producing 25,000 pages of transcript and a 433 page report by the special master. In all, the
case was argued for 22 hours before the Supreme Court, resulting in almost 500 pages of
transcript. Id
2 1. The United States argued on behalf of the Colorado River, Chemehueui, Cocopha,
Fort Mojave, and Fort Yuma (Quechan) Indian Tribes. Arizona, 103 S. Ct. at 1386.
22. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 601. There are several methods by which reserved water rights
have been quantified under the reserved water rights doctrine as developed by the Supreme
Court. The Court has stated that the amount of water reserved should be "that amount of
water necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation." Cappaert v. United States, 426
U.S. 128, 141 (1976). An early method of quantification employed by the Ninth Circuit
allowed non-Indians to continue using surplus reserved water subject to eventual displace-
ment by the Indians. Conrad Investment Co. v. United States, 161 F. 829 (9th Cir. 1908).
1984]
Catholic University Law Review
issued a decree in 1964 in order to effectuate its holding.23 In article IX of
this decree, the Court retained jurisdiction over the case for the purpose of
further modification and order.24
Because their interests had been represented by the government, the
tribes had not taken part in the litigation.25 In 1977, however, the tribes
sought to intervene as indispensible parties in order to raise additional
claims.26 The tribes maintained that the government had underestimated
the amount of irrigable acreage on their reservations, 27 and as a result they
received less water than they were entitled to receive. 28 The United States
conceded that the acreage had been miscalculated and joined the tribes'
plea. A special master appointed by the Court29 issued a report which
This approach assured the Indians of an adequate supply for their future needs but imposed
a hardship upon non-Indian users.
Another approach which has been used is to limit the Indians' reserved right to their
present use and reasonably forseeable needs at the time of the quantification. See, e.g.,
Tweedy v. Texas Co., 286 F. Supp. 383, 385 (D. Mont. 1968) ("need and use are prerequisite
to any water rights on Indian reservations"). This approach has the advantage of certainty
but tends to establish Indian reserved rights at artifically low levels. Note, A Proposalfor the
QuantifIcation of Reserved Indian Water Rights, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1299, 1314 (1974).
Another alternative is that adopted by the Supreme Court in the Arizona decision. The
Court followed the recommendation of the Special Master, stating, "How many Indians
there will be and what their future needs will be can only be guessed. We have concluded,
as did the Master, that the only feasible and fair way by which water rights can be measured
is irigable acreage." Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963). Under this formula-
tion, each acre of Indian land which can be irrigated economically is entitled to the amount
of water necessary for such irrigation. For comment on the relative merits of these stan-
dards, see infra note 114.
23. 376 U.S. 340 (1964), enforcing 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
24. Article IX of the decree states:
Any of the parties may apply at the foot of this decree for amendment or for
further relief. The Court retains jurisdiction of this suit for the purpose of any
order, direction, or modification of the decree, or any supplementary decree, that
may at any time be proper in relation to the subject matter in controversy.
Arizona, 376 U.S. at 353.
25. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
26. Arizona, 103 S. Ct. at 1387-88.
27. See Barbash, supra note 13. These claims were appurtenant to the "omitted lands."
Omitted lands are irrigable acreage within the recognized 1964 boundaries of the reserva-
tions for which the Indians maintain the United Stated failed to claim water rights in the
earlier litigations. These omitted lands claims are the focus of this article.
28. The tribes also claimed additional water rights appurtenant to "boundary lands."
Boundary lands were disputed lands along reservation borders claimed by the tribes to have
been finally determined to lie within the reservations under the meaning of the 1964 decree.
The Court's resolution of this claim is not discussed in this aritcle.
29. In the 1979 Supplemental decree, the Court appointed Senior Judge Elbert P. Tuttle
as special master. Arizona, 439 U.S. at 436-37.
[Vol. 33:457
Arizona v. California
concluded that the tribes were entitled to the additional allotment.3"
Writing for a five-Justice majority,3 ' Justice White acknowledged that
although the Court had the power to reopen the case, in the interests of
finality the decree would not be modified. The Court noted a major pur-
pose of the litigation was to set fixed standards on which all parties might
rely. Justice White emphasized that the principle of finality was especially
important where water rights are concerned.32
In his dissent, Justice Brennan criticized the inequitable result reached
by the majority and asserted that the tribes should be allowed to defend
their claims to greater allotments. He noted that the federal courts have
traditionally consented to reconsider a prior ruling where a manifest injus-
tice could be corrected. Justice Brennan also stressed that the litigation
had been far from final when the tribes raised their claims. Therefore, he
concluded that an adjustment could be made with little or no prejudice to
the interests of the other parties involved.33
This Note will examine the development of the federal reserved water
rights doctrine. Emphasis will be placed on prior cases arising under the
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction and their effect on the Arizona deci-
sion. An analysis of the history of the tribes' claims will suggest that the
Court properly applied the principle of finality to the issue at hand. Fi-
nally, the potential impact of Arizona on future Indian reserved water
rights litigation will be discussed.
I. FEDERAL RESERVED WATER RIGHTS, ORIGINAL JURISDICTION, AND
FINALITY: A REVIEW
A. The Development of the Federal Reserved Water Rights Doctrine
The reserved water rights doctrine was developed by the Supreme Court
in Winters v. United States.34 In Winters, an Indian irrigation project on a
Montana reservation was unable to obtain sufficient water because of up-
stream off-reservation diversions by private parties. The federal govern-
ment brought suit to prevent those parties from impeding the flow of water
to the reservation. Winters argued that, pursuant to Montana law and cus-
30. The special master's findings were "almost entirely consistent with the position of
the United States and the Indian Tribes." Arizona, 103 S. Ct. at 1388.
31. Justice White was joined in the majority by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Pow-
ell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor. Justice Brennan, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
was joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens. Justice Marshall took no part in the consider-
ation or decision of this case.
32. Arizona, 103 S. Ct. at 1386-96.
33. Id. at 1403-12.
34. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
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tom, his prior appropriation had to be recognized before any water could
be granted to either the United States or the Indians. He maintained that
his prior appropriation gave him a vested right to continue to divert and
use this water, and that the vested right was superior to that of all subse-
quent claimants.35 To settle the dispute, the Court looked to the 1888
treaty that had established the reservation.36 Although this agreement
failed to address the issue of water rights, the Court noted that the govern-
mental interest had been to enable the Indians to convert from a nomadic
to a pastoral state.37 Justice McKenna emphasized that the reservation
lands were arid and nearly worthless without water.3 8 Therefore, the
Court held that the creation of the Indian reservation implied a simultane-
ous reservation of water sufficient to fulfull its purpose.39
More than fifty years after the Winters. decision, the Supreme Court was
again asked to address the reserved water rights doctrine.4 ° In its original
hearing of Arizona v. California in 1963, 4" with respect to water rights in
the lower Colorado basin, the Court specifically reaffirmed the Winters
doctrine. The federal government had asserted reserved water rights
claims on behalf of five Indian tribes, 42 several national forests and parks,
and the Boulder Canyon Project Act.43 In addition to upholding the re-
served water rights claimed by the government on behalf of the Indians,
the Court also upheld for the first time reserved water rights claims for
non-Indian interests, such as national forests.4 The Court dispelled some
35. Id. at 565-69.
36. 25 Stat. 124.
37. 207 U.S. at 576.
38. Id
39. Id. at 576-77.
40. Comment, Paleface, Redskin, and the Great White Chiefs in Washington. Drawing
the Battle Lines Oer Western Water Rights, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 449, 455 (1980). The
Supreme Court found an implied reservation of water for a Crow Indian reservation in
United States v. Powers, but did not define the nature or extent of that right. 305 U.S. 527
(1939). The major issue in Powers concerned the distribution of the reserved water right
among the Indians living on the reservation. Id; see also United States v. Walker River
Irrigation Dist., 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939) (Indian reserved water rights could be im-
pliedly created by executive order as well as by treaty or agreement).
41. Arizona, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
42. See supra note 21.
43. 43 U.S.C. §§ 617-618p (1982).
44. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 601. The Court based the extension of the Winters doctrine
beyond the context of Indian reservations on the Special Master's conclusion that the princi-
ples expressed in Winters were equally applicable to lands set aside by the United States for
other purposes. It is now recognized that water rights may be impliedly reserved for any
lands which the federal government has reserved or withdrawn from the public domain.
Federal reservations differ from other public lands in that they are not subject to private
appropriation and disposal under the public land laws. These reservations include national
[Vol. 33:457
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of the uncertainty surrounding the scope of Indian reserved rights by
decreeing fixed allotments for the tribes involved.45 Over the objections of
the states, the Court concluded that both the Winters doctrine and consid-
erations of feasibility and equity dictated that the Indians' share include
enough water to satisfy both their present and future needs. Therefore, the
Court calculated the Indian allotment based on the amount of irrigable
acreage within their respective reservations.46
The reserved water rights doctrine gathered additional support in Cap-
paert v. United States.47 In Cappaert, the dispute centered on Devil's Hole,
an underground cavern inhabited by a rare species of desert fish.4 1 In or-
der to preserve its historic and scientific values, Devil's Hole had been re-
served in 1952 as a national monument.49 In 1968, the Cappaerts began
pumping ground water from the same acquifer that supplied water to
Devil's Hole. Because the fish population in Devil's Hole became severely
endangered by the pumping, the federal government brought suit to re-
strain the Cappaerts' pumping activity.5 0 In a unanimous decision, the
Court held that an implied reservation of water, sufficient to maintain the
water level within Devil's Hole, was within the purposes of the reservation
of the land as a national monument.5  This was the first case in which the
Supreme Court held that ground water, as well as surface water, could be
reserved and thus protected from diversion.
2
Until the mid-seventies, each Supreme Court holding on the substantive
nature of the federal reserved water rights doctrine had resulted in a
parks, monuments, and forests, fish and wildlife areas, and military bases, as well as Indian
reservations. Thus, a federally reserved water right may attach to any such lands withdrawn
for purposes which require the use of water. Ranquist, The Winters Doctrine and How it
Grew Federal Reservation ofRights to the Use of Water, I B.Y.U. L. REV. 639, 649-51
(1975).
45. See Arizona, 376 U.S. 340 (1964), enforcing 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
46. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 600-01.
47. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
48. Devil's Hole supported a population of unique fish traceable to the Pleistocene Era,
cyprinadon diabolis, commonly known as the Devil's Hole pupfish. Id at 133.
49. President Truman reserved Devil's Hole under the American Antiquities Preserva-
tion Act of 1906. Id at 131. This Act authorizes the President to declare as national monu-
ments "objects of historic or scientific interest that are situated upon the lands owned or
controlled by the Government of the United States." 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1982).
50. Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 133-35.
51. Id at 147.
52. Id. at 142-43. Several cases in the lower courts had applied the reserved water
rights doctrine to ground water prior to the Cappaert decision. See, e.g., Tweedy v. Texas
Co., 286 F. Supp. 383 (D. Mont. 1968); United States v. Fallbrook Pub. Util. Dist., 165 F.
Supp. 806 (S.D. Cal. 1958), rev'don other grounds, 347 F.2d 48 (9th Cir. 1965).
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broadening of these rights.53 In United States v. New Mexico,5 the Court
reversed this trend, and limited expansive federal water rights claims ap-
purtenant to the Gila National Forest.55 The area involved had been re-
served under the Organic Administration Act of 1897.56 The government
asserted that it had reserved water rights for use in the forest for several
purposes, including aesthetics, recreation, wildlife preservation, and stock
watering. The New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that the United
States had reserved sufficient water to fulfill the purposes for which the
land had originally been withdrawn. The court asserted, however, that
aesthetics, recreation, wildlife preservation, and stock watering were not
among those purposes.57 The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of
New Mexico's high court, and limited the government's reserved water
rights to the amount necessary to preserve timber in the forest or to secure
more favorable watershed flows. 58 The majority found that the other pur-
poses for which the United States had claimed reserved water rights were
not encompassed within the original purpose of the reservation of land.59
By applying a restrictive interpretation of purposes sufficient to activate
the reserved water rights doctrine, the Court hinted that greater recogni-
tion of state and private concerns in future reserved water rights cases
would be forthcoming.6"
The recently decided case of Nevada v. United States6 serves to illus-
trate the nature of the Indian reserved water rights dilemma. This dispute
focused on Pyramid lake, located in the Nevada desert near Reno. The
lake is fed by water from the Truckee River and has no outlet. Heavy
utilization of the Truckee's waters had caused the level of the lake to drop
53. Three Supreme Court decisions prior to Cappaert dealt with procedural questions
within the reserved water rights doctrine. These cases determined that federal reserved
water rights claims should be adjudicated in state court water litigation rather than special
federal court proceedings. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States,
424 U.S. 800 (1976); United States v. District Court for Water Div. No. 5, 401 U.S. 527
(1971); United States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520 (1971).
54. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
55. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
56. 16 U.S.C. §§ 473-75 (1982).
57. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 704-05.
58. Id. at 718.
59. A four-Justice dissent authored by Justice Powell applied a somewhat broader con-
struction of the Organic Act in finding wildlife preservation to be a legitimate purpose of the
reservation. Id at 718-25.
60. For commentary critical of the Court's opinion in United States v. New Mexico, see
Comment, United States v. New Mexico: Purposes That HoidNo Water, 22 ARIZ. L. REV. 19
(1980). For a contrary viewpoint, see Boles & Elliot, United States v. New Mexico and the
Course of Federal Reserved Water Rights, 51 U. COLO. L. REV. 209 (1980).
61. 103 S. Ct. 2906 (1983).
[Vol. 33:457
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some seventy feet 62 and its size to shrink by 20,000 acres.63 This in turn
threatened the existence of the lake's fishery, which is the primary source
of income for the Pyramid Lake Indian Tribe.6 4 Many non-Indian inter-
ests in the area also depend upon the Truckee River for water.65 Because
the region is arid and has no readily available alternate source of water,
these interests could be substantially damaged if they were forced to seek
water elsewhere.
66
In 1973, the United States and the Pyramid Lake Tribe brought an ac-
tion to obtain sufficient water rights to maintain the level of Pyramid
Lake. 67 The Court addressed whether the Indians were barred from as-
serting new claims because their reserved water rights claims had been pre-
viously adjudicated in an earlier case, the Orr Ditch litigation.68
In Orr Ditch, the government sought a decree to ascertain the water
rights of all users of Truckee River water. The United States, as plaintiff,
represented two interests: the Truckee-Carson Irrigation District, which
required water for a large irrigation project, and the Pyramid Lake Tribe,
which claimed a federally reserved water right.69 In the Orr Ditch decree,
issued in 1944, the Tribe's reserved water allotment had been limited to a
small amount of irrigation water.7° In representing the Tribe in Orr Ditch,
the United States had failed to assert a claim for enough water to maintain
the Tribe's Pyramid Lake fishery. After an extensive trial, the district
court held that the principle of res judicata barred the Indians from main-
taining a suit to obtain more water.7 ' The United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision in part and reversed in part.72
The court agreed that Orr Ditch precluded the United States and the Tribe
from maintaining a suit against the Orr Ditch defendants, their successors
in interest, and subsequent appropriators of the Truckee River, citing the
62. G.A.O. REPORT, supra note 3, at 36.
63. Nevada, 103 S. Ct. at 2913 & n.7.
64. Tribal representatives testified that the fishery contributed approximately $100,000
annually to the tribe's income and employed 40 members of the tribe on a full-time basis.
G.A.O. REPORT, supra note 3, at 36.
65. Off-reservation interests dependent upon the Truckee River for water include ap-
proximately 130,000 residents of Reno, Nevada, the Newlands irrigation project, which di-
verts 200,000 acre-feet of water per year from the river, and the Stillwater Wildlife Refuge,
which depends upon return flows from the Newlands project for its water. Id.
66. Id
67. United States v. Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist., 649 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1981),
reh'g. denied, 666 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1982).
68. United States v. Orr Water Ditch Co., Equity No. 3 (D. Nev. 1944).
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operation of res judicata. It observed, however, that neither the Tribe nor
the irrigation district were parties in Orr Ditch, but were instead repre-
sented by the United States. The court emphasized that the pleadings in
Orr Ditch did not specifically allege adversity between the claims asserted
on behalf of the reservation and those asserted on behalf of the irrigation
district. 73 The court further noted that the rules of res judicata are based
on an adversary system of procedure. 74 This, together with the fact that a
reserved water rights claim for fishery purposes had not been litigated in
Orr Ditch, led the court to hold that the Tribe could proceed in an action
against the irrigation district for more water.75
The irrigation district appealed to the Supreme Court, which unani-
mously reversed the holding of the court of appeals.76 The Court held that
the interests of the Tribe and irrigation district were sufficiently adverse to
bind both parties under the Orr Ditch decree by the operation of res judi-
cata. Moreover, the Court noted that the cause of action asserted by the
Tribe and the government was the same cause of action asserted in Orr
Ditch.7 Thus, the Orr Ditch decree was equally binding upon all parties
to the earlier litigation as well as to subsequent appropriators of water of
the Truckee River.78
A concurring opinion by Justice Brennan noted that the scarce western
water supply prevented the satisfaction of all water claims. 79 Brennan as-
serted that no matter how even-handed the ruling might be, the law was
powerless to avoid large measures of loss and disappointment in the face
of such fundamental natural limitations. Thus, despite the strong claims
of the Indians, the Court could not displace the thousands of farmers who
had relied on the judicial allocation of water made decades before.8" Jus-
tice Brennan suggested, however, that the Indians were entitled to com-
pensation where their water rights were appropriated for the benefit of
others.8 l
73. Nevada, 103 S. Ct. at 2922.
74. Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist., 649 F.2d at 1309.
75. Id In accordance with their ruling, the Ninth Circuit stipulated that any additional
water rights awarded to the tribe must come from the rights decreed to the government in
1944. This permitted neither the government nor the tribe to expand their water rights be-
yond the water rights awarded to the government in the Orr Ditch decree. Id. at 1313.
76. Nevada, 103 S. Ct. at 2907.
77. Id. at 2925-26.
78. Id at 2926.
79. Id (Brennan, J., concurring).
80. Id
81. Id Justice Brennan stated that the law "can and should fix responsibility for loss
and destruction that should have been avoided, and it can and should require that those
whose water rights are appropriated for the benefit of others receive appropriate compensa-
tion." See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 33:457
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B. Modification of Water Rights Decrees in Response to Changed
Circumstances
Among the disputes litigated under the Supreme Court's original juris-
diction are two in which the Court retained jurisdiction and subsequently
modified the original decree. In each case, the Court had retained jurisdic-
tion through provisions virtually identical to article IX in Arizona. When
changing conditions rendered the decrees inappropriate for their original
purpose, the Court stepped in to make the needed modifications. In Wis-
consin v. Illinois,82 several states bordering on the Great Lakes sought to
enjoin the diversion of water from Lake Michigan. Under a permit from
the Secretary of War, the City of Chicago had been diverting up to 8,500
cubic feet of water per second from the lake for sanitary purposes. 83 The
states claimed that this diversion lowered the water level of the lakes a full
six inches resulting in injury to their citizens. 8' The Court agreed, finding
that the Secretary of War had exceeded his authority. 5 In a decree issued
in 1930, the Court mandated a gradual reduction in the diversions to 1,500
cubic feet per second.8 6 The Court issued new decrees in 1956 and 1957
that temporarily modified the original order in response to low water con-
ditions on the Mississippi River.87 Finally, in 1967 the Court issued an-
other decree that superseded its previous order.88 This decree purported to
set final limits for all diversions of water from Lake Michigan.
New Jersey v. New York 89 also concerned a multistate dispute over the
diversion of water. In 1931, the State of New Jersey sued the State and
City of New York to enjoin the latter from diverting water from the
tributaries of the Delaware river. Pennsylvania later intervened to protect
82. 278 U.S. 367 (1928).
83. Id at 410.
84. Id. at 407.
85. Id at 420.
86. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 281 U.S. 696 (1930), enforcing 278 U.S. 367 (1929).
87. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 352 U.S. 983 (1957), and 352 U.S. 945 (1956), modifying 281
U.S. 696 (1930). These decrees authorized temporary diversions up to 8,500 gallons per
second to correct an emergency in navigation caused by the low level of the Mississippi
River. Following the expiration of these orders, the original 1930 decree retained full force
and effect.
88. 388 U.S. 426 (1967), modifying 278 U.S. 367 (1929). Paragraph 7 of this decree
provides that:
Any of the parties hereto may apply at the foot of this decree for any other or
further action or relief, and this Court retains jurisdiction of the suits in Nos. 1, 2,
and 3, Original Docket, for the purpose of making any order, or direction, or modi-
fication of this decree, or any supplemental decree, which it may deem at any time
to be proper in relation to the subject matter in controversy.
Id at 430.
89, 283 U.S. 336 (1931).
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its interest in the river.9" In its decree, 9 ' the Supreme Court permitted
New York to divert up to 440 million gallons of water a day from the
Delaware watershed. As in Wisconsin, the Court retained jurisdiction over
the case, giving any party the right to apply for further action or relief.92
This decree was superseded in 1954 by a decree taking into account
changes in the watershed brought about by the construction of dams and
reservoirs in New York. 93 Once again, the Court retained jurisdiction over
the matter.94
Both Wisconsin and New Jersey were interstate water controversies sub-
ject to the doctrine of equitable apportionment.95 The Supreme Court
modified these decrees when their operation became inequitable due to
conditions arising after the decrees had been issued. In neither case did
the Court set any standards concerning when such modifications should be
made. In Arizona v. California, the Court faced the issue of whether modi-
fication remains an appropriate response where one party alleges error in
factual determinations made before the decree was issued.
II. ARIZONA V CALIFORNIA
A. What Price Finality." The Court Divides
In Arizona v. California,96 the United States Supreme Court addressed
whether water rights adjudicated in 1963 should now be modified because
of information suggesting that the prior allocations had been erroneous.
The special master concluded that the 1964 decree should be modified to
award the Indian tribes water rights reflective of the true amount of irriga-
ble acreage within their reservations. 97 The Arizona majority concluded
otherwise, however, and sustained the exceptions of the states and private
agencies to the special master's report.98 The dissenters asserted that the
90. Id at 338-39.
91. 283 U.S. 805, enforcing 283 U.S. 336 (1931).
92. Id at 807.
93. 347 U.S. 995 (1954).
94. Id at 1005.
95. Equitable apportionment is a judicially created doctrine applied to the resolution of
interstate water disputes. See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) (each state is entitled
to equitable apportionment of benefits from the flow of a river).
96. 103 S. Ct. 1382 (1983).
97. The special master's report found that, even under the state's legal theories, at least
18,500 acres of the omitted lands were irrigable and thus would have supported an award of
additional water rights if they had been identified in 1963. Arizona, 103 S. Ct. at 1404. See
supra note 27. The report concluded the tribes should be awarded 196,000 more acre-feet of
water per year for the overlooked omitted lands, and 122,000 acre-feet for the enlarged
boundary lands. Mann, supra note 8, at I, col. 4; see supra note 28.
98. 103 S. Ct. at 1396.
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irrigable acreage issue had not been fully and fairly litigated in 1963, 99 and
that consequently this litigation remained far from final in 1977 when the
tribes raised their claim for additional water.l°°
Writing for the majority, Justice White acknowledged that article IX of
the 1964 decree gave the Court the power to reopen the matter, but noted
that it did not compel the Court to do so.' 0 ' He also acknowledged that
the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and law of the case were
not controlling, and looked instead to the general principles of finality and
repose upon which these doctrines are founded.' °2 Reading article IX in
light of these principles, Justice White concluded that the article should be
applied restrictively. He interpreted article IX as a safety net designed to
ensure that the Court had not precluded itself from adjusting the decree in
response to unforseeable changes in circumstances. 0 3 He cited the Court's
use of similar provisions in Wisconsin v. llinois and New Jersey v. New
York in support of his interpretation.' °4
The majority viewed considerations of finality especially compelling in
the context of this particular litigation. It noted that the doctrine of prior
appropriation had been developed in response to the need for certainty in
the holding and exercise of water rights.'0 5 Justice White emphasized that
a great deal of reliance is placed upon water rights adjudications. 0 6 The
majority referred to its earlier opinion in United States v. New Mexico,107
which stated that an increase in federal reserved water rights might require
a gallon-for-gallon reduction in water available to other users in time of
shortage. 0 8 To reconsider the Indian's renewed claims, the majority em-
phasized, could upset the delicate balance of water use established along
99. Id. at 1408-09.
100. Id at 1406.
101. Id at 1391.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1393.
104. Id. at 1394; see supra notes 82 & 89 and accompanying text.
105. Under the doctrine of prior appropriation, the individual who first appropriates
water and puts it to beneficial use acquires a vested right to continue to divert and use that
quantity of water against all claimants junior to him in point of time. This principle has also
been expressed as "first in time, first in right." Arizona, 373 U.S. at 555. Under this doc-
trine, potential water users may determine existing water rights and the availability of unap-
propriated water left for new projects, thus bringing a level of certainty to water planning.
Because federal reserved water rights need not be applied to a beneficial use to be retained,
they are in some ways incompatible with the prior appropriation doctrine. G.A.O. REPORT,
supra note 3, at 6.
106. See supra note 11.
107. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
108. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 705.
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the Colorado River. 10 9
In its review of the history of Arizona v. California, the Court concluded
that the earlier determination of water allotments had been intended to be
final."O It noted that the practicably irrigable acreage standard"' was se-
lected in response to the Court's interest in a fixed allotment that would
take the future needs of the Indians into account." 12 Justice White noted
that the use of the standard had been vigorously contested by the states
and emphasized that the Indian victory on this issue had been founded on
the need for a stable allocation system.' He stressed that this standard
remains an object of controversy.' White compared opening the decree
at this point in order to recalculate the amount of irrigable acreage as akin
to opening a Pandora's box, in that all aspects of the first decree, including
the irrigable acreage standard itself, could then be subject to relitigation
and adjustment.'5
109. Arizona, 103 S. Ct. at 1393 & n.14.
110. The special master concluded that a reservation of water sufficient to supply all of
the practicably irrigable acreage on each reservation would "establish water rights of fixed
magnitude and priority so as to provide certainty for both the United States and non-Indian
users." Arizona, 103 S. Ct. at 1394 & n. 15. See Arizona, 373 U.S. at 601.
11. See supra note 22.
112. Arizona, 103 S. Ct. at 1390.
113. Id
114. See supra note 22. For critical views of the irrigable acreage standard, see Note, A
Proposalfor the Quantification of Reserved Indian Water Rights, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1299
(1974). This Note criticizes the irrigable acreage standard as impractical given the large
amounts of irrigable lands upon Indian reservations and the limits of water availability.
The standard is also criticized as imposing artificial limits upon reservations that use water
for nonagricultural or mixed purposes. The writer recommends quantification based on the
present use and needs of the Indians as the most reasonable approach. Id at 1312-14. See
also Shrago, Emerging Indian Water Rights: An Analysis ofRecent Judicial and Legislative
Developments, 26 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1105 (1980). If the practicably irrigable acre-
age standard were applied uniformily throughout Arizona, Shrago wrote, the Indian tribes
would ostensibly be entitled to more than ten times the amount of the annual dependable
water supply, assuming only one-third of the reservation lands are "practicably irrigable."
He suggests that the doctrine of equitable apportionment should be applied to conflicts be-
tween federally reserved water rights and state water rights. Id. at 1115-17. But see Veeder,
Water Rights in the Coal Fields of the Yellowstone River Basin, 40 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
77 (1976). Veeder maintains that limiting Indian reserved water rights to the purpose for
which the reservation was made unduly restricts water rights. He argues that the Supreme
Court's holding in Winters extends to industrial as well as irrigation rights. Id at 89-90; see
Veeder, Indian Prior and Paramount Rights to the Use of Water, 16 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L.
INST. 631 (1971).
115. Arizona, 103 S. Ct. at 1395. Justice White linked the irrigable acreage standard
itself to the principle of finality. Therefore, under the majority view, the irrigable acreage
standard may be abandoned where the finality of earlier allocations is weakened. The Pan-
dora's box metaphor represents the majority's view that the tribes should be satisfied with
the substantial rights won in the earlier litigation, and that to press for larger claims may
result in risk to what has already been won.
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Finally, Justice White rejected the contention that the absence of the
tribes in the original trial mitigates the finality of the 1964 allocation." 6
He found no evidence in the record that the government's representation
of the tribes had been either legally inadequate or compromised by a con-
flict of interest." 7 To the contrary, he reasoned that the substantial water
allocations the tribes had been awarded" 8 reflected upon the competency
of the government as a representative of Indian interests.
Justice Brennan, concurring in part and dissenting in part, 1 9 criticized
the majority for the excessive weight it placed upon the principle of final-
ity. He evaluated the tribes' claims in the context of issues considered at
an earlier stage of an ongoing litigation. 2 ° The dissent asserted that this
litigation was far from final' 2 ' when the tribes raised their claims for addi-
tional water in 1977.122 In support of its assertion, the dissent noted that
the Court did not confirm a list of state present perfected rights' 23 until
1979. Brennan described these rights as critical to the original decree's
allocation system.' 24 He recognized that there is a formal point of final
116. Arizona, 103 S. Ct. at 1395-96.
117. Id at 1396.
118. The Court had awarded the five tribes approximately one million acre-feet of re-
served water annually. The annual supply at the time of this award was estimated to be six
or seven million acre-feet, giving the tribes some 15% of the average flow of the Colorado
River. American Indian Law Symposium, 15 TULSA L.J. 711 (1980). At the time this award
was made the total population of the five tribes was only 3,304 persons, a very small portion
of the population of the Colorado Basin. Shrago, supra note 114, at 1114.
119. Justice Brennan joined part III of the Court's opinion, which granted the tribes
permission to join in this action. Arizona, 103 S. Ct. at 1403 (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
120. Id at 1404.
121. Id at 1405.
122. The Fort Mojave, Chemehueui, and Fort Yuma (Quechan) Indian Tribes moved
for leave to intervene in 1977. By April 10, 1978, the Colorado River and Cocopah Indian
Tribes had also filed petitions for intervention. The United States, which initially opposed
the tribes' intervention, joined the tribes in December 1978 in moving for a supplemental
decree. Id at 1388.
123. In the context of this litigation, present perfected rights are those rights to use Colo-
rado mainstream flows which vested before the effective date of the Boulder Canyon Project
Act, supra note 43, at § 617. The reserved water rights allocated to the tribes are included in
these present perfected rights. The 1964 decree in Arizona contained a partial list of present
perfected rights which did not include those present perfected rights acquired under state
law. The full list of present perfected rights was confirmed by the Court in 1979. Arizona v.
California, 439 U.S. 419 (1979), enforcing 373 U.S. 546 (1963); see,4rizona, 103 S. Ct. at
1386-87.
124. The Secretary of the Interior must satisfy present perfected rights to their full extent,
even during drought years. Thus, the more present perfected rights there are, the less certain
it is that other users will receive a specific amount of water, especially in years when flows
are lower than normal levels. Id. at 1405 & n.2.
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judgment, 125 where considerations of certainty and reliance take on
greater strength than they had before the judgment. He maintained, how-
ever, that this point had not yet been reached when the tribes sought to
intervene in this litigation.'
26
Justice Brennan conceded that finality remains an important policy even
before final judgment has been reached.' 27 He noted, however, that the
weight given to consideration of finality at this stage of litigation is left
largely to a court's best judgment.12' The dissent observed that neither the
tribes nor the states are currently using all of the water they received in the
1964 allotments. 129 Partly on this basis, the special master predicted that
adjustments in the 1964 decree would not significantly prejudice the
states.' 30 Justice Brennan concluded that because of the timing of the
tribes' claim, the ongoing nature of the litigation, and the lack of immedi-
ate economic disruption if water rights were adjusted, the interests of final-
ity did not merit the overriding importance that the majority had attached
to them.
The dissent also asserted that failure to consider the omitted land claims
would result in a manifest injustice to the tribes. Where a previous deci-
sion is clearly erroneous and would result in manifest injustice, the law of
the case doctrine permits a court to override that decision.' If the 1964
decree was not corrected, Justice Brennan warned, the tribes would forever
lose water rights to which they were entitled under the 1963 decision.'
32
He did not dispute the majority's contention that the government's earlier
representation of the tribes was not compromised by a conflict of interest
or otherwise legally inadequate. Rather, he reasoned that the govern-
ment's failure to present evidence on all of the potentially irrigable lands
125. Arizona, 103 S. Ct. at 1404.
126. Id. at 1406.
127. Id. at 1404-05.
128. Id. at 1404.
129. Id at 14091 Of the approximately one million acre-feet awarded to the tribes in
Arizona v. California, only 200,000 had been put to use at the time of the trial. Meyers, Book
Review, 77 YALE L.J. 1036, 1042 n.15 (1968). The Fort Mojave Indian Tribe first began to
use its allotment in 1975. From 1975 until 1981, the Tribes collectively diverted 77% of the
water to which they were entitled under the 1981 decree. Arizona, 103 S. Ct. at 1409 & n.9.
130. Arizona, 103 S. Ct. at 1409.
131. Id. at 1391 n.8. Under law of the case doctrine, a court may depart from a prior
holding where one of the following circumstances exists: substantially different evidence is
presented upon a subsequent trial, controlling authority has since reached a different conclu-
sion of law to be applied to such issues, or the earlier decision was erroneous and would
result in a manifest injustice. Short v. United States, 661 F.2d 150, 154 (Ct. Cl. 1981); see
United States v. Turtle Mtn. Band of Chippewa Indians, 612 F.2d 517, 521 (Ct. Cl. 1979);
White v. Murtha, 377 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1967). See 103 S. Ct. at 1395 & n.19.
132. Arizona, 103 S. Ct. at 1407.
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within the tribes' reservations weakened the majority's assertion that the
irrigability of the omitted lands was fully and fairly litigated in 1963.133 In
sum, the dissent found no justification for denying the tribes a hearing on
the omitted lands claims.
134
B. Arizona v. Calfornia: the Implications for Future Indian Reserved
Water Rights Litigation
In his dissent, Justice Brennan cautioned against making the assumption
that the irrigability of the reservation lands had been fully and fairly liti-
gated in 1963.131 It is undeniable, however, that the United States had
ample opportunity to present evidence on the amounts of irrigable acreage
in the original proceeding. Furthermore, the dissent presented nothing to
indicate that the government's failure to produce fully accurate evidence
on the irrigable acreage issue was due to a conflict of interest.1
36
The United States attributed the error to the complexity of the litigation.
The special master's report prepared for the 1963 case equated practicably
irrigable acreage with economic feasibility; a finding that annual benefits
from irrigation would exceed costs.' 37 Given the imprecise nature of this
standard, 38 and the general complexity, length, and expense of compre-
hensive water rights cases such as Arizona v. California,139 the govern-
ment's explanation seems plausible. The state parties claimed that the
smaller claim was made for tactical reasons because the irrigable acreage
standard would seem more reasonable, and therefore would be more likely
to be accepted.'41 Whatever the explanation, it is apparent that the issue
of irrigable acreage was fully litigated in 1963. 14' The technicality that
evidence was not presented on the omitted lands does not change this as-
sessment. Indeed, both the government and the special master realized in
1963 that there may be additional irrigable lands within the reserva-
133. Id. at 1408-09.
134. Id. at 1409 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
135. Id
136. Id. at 1408-09.
137. Bums, Cummings, Gorman, & Landsford, The "'New Arizona v. California". Practi-
cably Irrigable Acreage and Economic Feasibility, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 517 (1982).
138. Id. at 521-22. The writers note the uncertainties inherent in measuring the feasibil-
ity of a right that is "reserved" through time with a standard that exists at a particular
moment in time.
139. See supra note 40, at 479.
140. Arizona, 103 S. Ct. at 1390.
141. The American Law Institute states that "the principle of finality has its strongest
justification where the parties have had full oportunity to litigate a controversy ...." RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 15, comment a (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978).
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tions.' 4 2 The dissent also asserted that the case was far from final when
the tribes entered the lawsuit. 14 3 While it is true the Court did not confirm
a list of present perfected rights 44 until 1979,14. this does not mitigate the
finality of issues settled in 1964.146 Under the dissent's reasoning, the
Supreme Court could not issue a final decree until every aspect of a dis-
pute has been settled. In comprehensive water rights cases such as Ari-
zona, this would directly undermine the certainty which is a primary goal
of such decisions, and delay further the issuance of decrees already subject
to extended litigation.
These facts alone would dictate the outcome were this not a case of orig-
inal jurisdiction, with a decree that included a provision for retention of
jurisdiction for the purposes of modification.14 7 As revealed by a review of
prior cases, there is little direct precedent to guide the Court in this area. It
is apparent, however, that some threshold point must be reached before
Supreme Court decrees are reopened, lest they be unduly weakened. In
both Wisconsin v. Illinois and New Jersey v. New York, the Court modified
its decrees in response to changed conditions that made the continued op-
eration of the decrees inequitable. 148 Moreover, these cases were governed
by judicial principle which holds that states should enjoy equitable appor-
tionment of benefits from river flow.' 49 In deciding upon the practicably
irrigable acreage standard, the Arizona Court had declined to apply the
doctrine of equitable apportionment to the tribes' claims. 5 ° Thus, these
cases provide some quidelines as to when it is appropriate to reopen prior
decrees for adjustment.
The question of whether the tribes will suffer a manifest injustice as a
result of this decision is a more difficult one. As a result of the Court's
decision, the tribes will lose valuable water rights to which they had previ-
ously been entitled.' 5 ' The majority noted that, to date, the tribes are not
yet able to use all the water allocated to them in 1964.'52 When the serious
142. Arizona, 103 S. Ct. at 1393 & n.14.
143. Id at 1405.
144. See supra notes 123-24.
145. Arizona, 439 U.S. 419 (1979), enforcing 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
146. Arizona, 103 S. Ct. at 1391 & n.7. The Court cited to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS: "A judgment may be final in a res judicata sense as to part of an action
although litigation continues as to the rest." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13,
comment e (1980); see also 103 S. Ct. 1393 & n.12.
147. See supra note 24.
148. See supra notes 82-95 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 95.
150. Arizona, 103 S. Ct. at 1395.
151. Id. at 1407.
152. Id. at 1395 & n.19. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. Although the Indi-
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water shortages throughout the West are considered, the majority asserted,
this does not qualify as a manifest injustice.' 53 Nevertheless, from the
standpoint of the tribes, it would seem that justice is taking a backseat to
finality. The irrigable acreage standard, selected by the Court as the most
feasible and fair method of quantification, does not achieve fairness when
it is applied on the basis of incorrect facts. It is difficult to see how justice
is well served by refusing to adjust the Indians' water appropriation to
reflect the Court's original intent. Even if this decision is conceded to work
a manifest injustice, however, it is uncertain at best whether law of the case
principles should be applied to the situation of original jurisdiction.' 54 Al-
though it is not difficult to sympathize with the position of the tribes, the
dissent's assertion that the issue of irrigable acreage has yet to be fully
litigated is weak. Having had their day in court, the tribes' recourse, if
any, lies not in pursuing further a thirty-year-old litigation, but in an ac-
tion against the federal government as a representative of their interests."'
Indian organizations have been quick to criticize the result of Arizona v.
California.156 The Court's decision, however, may not represent a total
ans cannot yet make use of their entire water appropriation from Arizona's 1964 decree, the
fault may lie partly with the federal government. Commentators have noted that Indian
water resources were largely iqnored while the government was making massive financial
commitments to develop water resources on non-Indian lands. Dumars & Ingram, Congres-
sional Quantification of Indian Reserved Water Rights." A Definitive Solution or a Mirage?, 20
NAT. RESOURCES J. 17, 42 (1980); see Price & Weatherford, Indian Water Rights in Theory
and Practice: Najavo Experience in the Colorado River Basin, 40 LAW & CONTEM P. PROBS.
97, 131 (1976) ("The stark truth of the matter is that, beginning at the turn of the century, the
offices and powers of the national government were marshalled to plan, construct, and
finance non-Indian agricultural development in the West, and nothing comparable was done
for the Native American").
153. Arizona, 103 S. Ct. at 1395 & n.19.
154. Law of the case doctrine posits that when a court settles upon a rule of law, that
decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.
IB J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & T. CURRIER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 0.404 (1983). The
Court noted, however, that,
law of the case doctrine was understandably crafted with the course of ordinary
litigation in mind. Such litigation proceeds through preliminary stages, generally
matures at trial, and produces a judgment, to which after appeal, the binding final-
ity of res judicata and collateral estoppel will attach. To extrapolate wholesale law
of the case into the situation of our original jurisdiction, where jurisdiction to ac-
commodate changed circumstances is often retained, would weaken to an intolera-
ble extent the finality of our Decrees in original actions, particularly in a case such
as this turning on statutory rather than Court-fashioned equitable criteria.
Arizona, 103 S. Ct. at 1391.
155. For a general review of Indian remedies against the government for breach of trust,
see Newton, Enforcing the Federal-Indian Trust Relationship After Mitchell, 31 CATH. U.L.
REV. 635 (1982); Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of/the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indi-
ans, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213 (1975).
156. Barbash, supra note 13, at All, col. 6.
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defeat for Indian interests. While the Court's holding precluded the plain-
tiff tribes from gaining additional water rights, it also provided an endorse-
ment of the practicably irrigable acreage standard as a vehicle for the
quantification of Indian reserved rights. 5 7 The use of this standard, op-
posed by the states, 58 may have a significant impact on Indian claims that
remain undefined. The most significant of these claims is that of the Nav-
ajo Tribe. Located within the Colorado basin, the 25,000 square-mile
Navajo reservation is the largest in the country.' 59 The potential Navajo
Winters rights, based on the practicably irrigable acreage standard, are
staggering.' 6° The Court, however, has demonstrated a strong sense of
pragmatism in recent reserved water rights cases. As Justice Brennan
noted in Nevada, the Court is fully aware of the limitations imposed by a
scarce water supply.' 6 ' In future litigation in which the available water
supply is inadequate to satisfy valid competing claims, neither party is
likely to receive the full amount of its claim. Thus, despite decades of
litigation, peace in the Colorado basin may prove more distant than ever.
111. CONCLUSION
InArizona v. California, the Supreme Court determined that the princi-
ple of finality precluded relitigation of Indian reserved water rights claims.
The policy questions of whether judicial finality should be sacrificed in the
interests of fairness to the Indians can be debated endlessly. The Court,
however, seems to approach the problem presented by Arizona v. Califor-
nia as one of wise water management, recognizing that where demand ex-
ceeds supply, some interests must suffer. The majority adopts an even-
handed approach to the case, seeking to parcel out the burdens of western
water scarcity more evenly. Given the heightened interest in certainty in-
157. As the Supreme Court's most recent ruling on the standard for quantification of
Indian reserved rights, the Court's continued reliance on the irrigable acreage standard will
have a broad impact. This standard was adopted by the Court, however, upon the recom-
mendation of a particular special master and for application to this particular litigation.
Given this, Arizona v. Calforna does not represent a definitive ruling on this subject, espe-
cially in view of the stress a blanket application of this standard could place on water sup-
plies elsewhere. See supra notes 114 & 118, infra note 160. For criticism of this standard as
either too restrictive or too expansive, see supra note 114.
158. Arizona, 103 S. Ct. at 1395. The Winters doctrine itself has been opposed by the
western states since its creation. Comment, supra note 40, at 451.
159. Black & Taylor, supra note 1, at 73.
160. Id. at 74. The authors estimate that even using a conservative estimate of the practi-
cably irrigable acreage within the reservation, the tribal entitlement would be approximately
two million acre-feet of water annually. Under the decree in Arizona v. California, the entire
state of Arizona receives only 2.8 million acre-feet annually. Id.
161. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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herent in water rights litigation, the principle of finality becomes an effec-
tive water management tool.
The recent decision in Arizona v. California suggests that the Supreme
Court is no longer as likely to endorse expansive reserved rights in water
rights litigation. In future reserved water rights litigation, a high premium
will be placed upon quantification of water rights and on maintaining
prior water allotments. Thus, where water rights are fixed by decree, they
are not likely to be enlarged. Although this represents a shift away from
the policies advocated by Indians, Arizona v. Calfornia does provide sup-
port for the irrigable acreage standard widely opposed by the states. This
may ultimately benefit the many tribes whose water rights remain unde-
fined. Given the importance of water to economic development in the
West, and the limited nature of water resources, the Court's decision in
Arizona v. California may ultimately serve to exacerbate, rather than to
reduce, tensions among competing water users in the Southwest. These
same factors, however, underscore the necessity of determining with final-
ity relative rights to this region's scarce water supply.
Roger Florio
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